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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Appellee/Respondent, : 
v. : 
WILLIAM JOSEPH IRELAND, : Case No. 20050600-SC 
20040502-CA 
Appellant/Petitioner, : 
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR APPEAL 
"Whether a concealed gesture of a hand in a pocket is sufficient to meet the 
criteria for aggravated robbery under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302." See Order in 
Addendum A. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW/ PRESERVATION 
This Court reviews the decision of the court of appeals for correctness. See In 
re A.T.. 2001 UT 82, ^ 5, 34 P.3d 228. The court of appeals reviewed the trial court's 
statutory interpretation for correctness. State v. Ireland. 2005 UT App 209, If 6, 113 
P.3d 1028 (citing State v. Pixton. 2004 UT App 275, TJ 4, 98 P.3d 433). The issue was 
preserved in the trial court. R. 38-41, 54-61, 114. 
OPINION BELOW 
Ireland, 2005 UT App 209 is in Addendum B. A copy of the companion case, 
State v. Johnson, 2005 UT App 210 (unpublished) in Addendum C. 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This Court granted certiorari review of the Court of Appeals' decision on the 
issue set forth above. See Order in Addendum A. This Court has jurisdiction 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (2002). 
TEXT OF RELEVANT STATUTES 
The texts of the following statutes are in Addendum D: 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (2003); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601(5) (2003). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The state charged Petitioner/Appellant William Ireland ("Petitioner" or 
"Ireland") with one count of aggravated robbery, a first degree felony in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (2003), and theft of services, a class B misdemeanor in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-409 (2003), in an Information dated December 9, 
2003. R. 6-8. Following bind-over, Petitioner moved to reduce the charge of 
aggravated robbery to a second degree felony and filed a memorandum in support of 
that motion. R. 28, 38-41. After the state responded (R. 42-44), the trial court held a 
hearing on the motion on March 17, 2004. R. 114. The trial court entered a 
Memorandum Decision denying the motion on April 2, 2004. A copy of that 
Memorandum Decision is in Addendum E. Ireland entered a conditional plea of 
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guilty to aggravated robbery, a first degree felony. R. 73-80. Pursuant to that 
conditional plea, Ireland reserved the right to appeal the denial of his motion to reduce 
the aggravated robbery charge to simple robbery. R. 73. The trial court sentenced 
Ireland to serve five years to life at the Utah state prison and entered judgment on 
June 7, 2004. R. 94-95. 
Ireland timely appealed. R. 96. In an opinion issued May 12, 2005, the court 
of appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court, holding that the trial court did not 
err in refusing to reduce the charge to robbery. See Ireland, 2005 UT App 209 in 
Addendum B. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On December 6, 2003, Jeffrey Reinkoester was working as a sales associate at 
a jewelry store in the north end of Gateway Plaza in Salt Lake City. R. 114:5-6. In 
the late afternoon, Reinkoester saw a man later identified as Petitioner William 
Ireland walking toward the store. R. 114:6. It was cold outside and Ireland was 
wearing a big puffy coat and had at least one of his hands in his pocket. R. 114:10, 
11, 19. Reinkoester could not remember whether Petitioner reached out with a hand 
to open the door. R. 114:7. Ireland entered the store and Reinkoester greeted him. R. 
114:9. Ireland responded by saying, "I want you to go and get me all the money in 
the cash drawer right now." R. 114:9. 
Ireland's hand was in his pocket close to his body pointed toward Reinkoester. 
R. 114:11. Reinkoester described it as "gesturing like a weapon, but it was more 
subtle." R. 114:12. Ireland never said that he had a weapon or made any verbal 
3 
statements suggesting he had or would use a weapon or did anything else to suggest 
he might use a weapon. R. 114:13, 23. Nevertheless, Reinkoester testified that he 
thought Ireland might have a gun. R. 114:13, 23. Reinkoester acknowledged that his 
thoughts about a weapon were just speculation and that he had no reason to think that 
Ireland had a gun rather than a knife. R. 114:23. When Reinkoester filled out the 
police report, he did not say anything about the robber having his hands in his 
pockets; he did indicate that there might have been a weapon in the robber's pocket, 
"if there was one." R. 114:25-6, 29. 
Reinkoester walked around the desk to where the cash drawer was located. R. 
114:10. He was not looking at Ireland and instead focused on the cash drawer. R. 
114:21. When Reinkoester got to the desk with the cash drawer, he put what little 
cash the store had in a bag; Ireland then asked for jewelry to be added to the bag. R. 
114:13, 14. 
While at the cash drawer, Reinkoester could not see Ireland's hands because 
the desk with the cash drawer was too high. R. 114:14. Reinkoester did not know 
whether Petitioner's hands were inside or outside his pockets at that point. R. 114:22. 
Ireland did not make gestures toward Reinkoester at any time while Reinkoester was 
at the desk getting the cash. R. 114:22. 
There were four other employees and two customers in the store while the 
robbery was taking place. R. 114:12. At about the time Ireland asked for the jewelry, 
the owner of the store noticed that something was wrong and exited the store. R. 
114:14. Ireland asked Reinkoester to give him the bag, then went to the front door. 
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R.114:15. Reinkoester could not recall whether Ireland took the bag with his right or 
left hand and could not remember whether he ever saw Ireland's right hand outside of 
the pocket. R. 114:15. After Ireland left the store, the owner chased him and 
retrieved the bag and money. R. 114:15; 116:4. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
In order to elevate a robbery to an aggravated robbery, Utah's statutory scheme 
requires more than the use or threatened use of a facsimile or representation of a 
dangerous weapon. The legislature defined dangerous weapon for the purposes of 
aggravated robbery as not only a representation or facsimile of a dangerous weapon, 
but in addition, that the representation or facsimile be used in a way that leads the 
victim to reasonably believe that it is likely to cause death or, in the alternative, that 
the actor represent that he is in control of a dangerous weapon. In order to give 
meaning to all of the words in the statute and preclude subsections (i) and (ii) from 
being superfluous, a robber must do something in addition to using or threatening to 
use a facsimile or representation. Even if a concealed hand in the pocket qualifies as 
a representation under the first part of the statute, a further representation, verbal or 
otherwise, that the robber will use the gun or objective facts that make it reasonable to 
believe that the item is likely to cause death is required in order to elevate the crime to 
aggravated robber. A concealed gesture in a pocket does not meet this definition. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT. A CONCEALED GESTURE OF A HAND IN A POCKET IS 
NOT SUFFICIENT TO MEET THE CRITERIA FOR AGGRAVATED 
ROBBERY UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-302 
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The only issue throughout this case has been whether Petitioner committed the 
crime of simple or aggravated robbery when he made a concealed gesture with his 
hand in his pocket but made no verbal or other representation that he had a dangerous 
weapon or that he would use a weapon as part of the robbery. The relevant statutes 
require that in order to use or threaten to use a dangerous weapon so as to elevate a 
crime from simple to aggravated robbery, a person must use or threaten to use a 
facsimile or representation of a weapon and must further represent that he is in control 
of a dangerous weapon. Since gesturing with a hand in a pocket fails to meet these 
requirements, a concealed gesture of a hand is not sufficient to elevate a robbery from 
a simple to aggravated robbery. 
This Court's primary goal in interpreting statutes "is to evince 'the true intent 
and purpose of the Legislature.'" State v. Maestas, 2002 UT 123, If 52, 63 P.3d 621 
(citation omitted). Accordingly, this Court looks to the plain language of the statute 
which provides the Court "with the road map to the statute's meaning. . . ." Id. 
"[T]he plain language of the statute [is read] as a whole, and . . . its provisions [are 
interpreted] . . . in harmony with other statutes in the same chapter and related 
chapters." Miller v. Weaver, 2003 UT 12, H 17, 66 P.3d 592 (citations omitted). 
Words in a statute that have a commonly accepted meaning should be given that 
common, lay meaning unless there is an indication that the legislature intended 
otherwise. Travelers/Aetna Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 2002 UT App 221, 1j 12, 51 P.3d 
1288. The Court's purpose in interpreting the statute is "'to render all parts . . . 
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relevant and meaningful,' and [this Court] presume[s] the legislature used each term 
advisedly and . . . according to its ordinary meaning.'" Maestas, 2002 UT 123 at (^52 
(citations omitted). 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 (2003) outlines the elements for simple robbery. 
Pursuant to that provision, a person commits a simple robbery if s/he uses force or 
fear to take personal property from another or uses force or fear against another in the 
course of committing a theft. Id. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 provides: 
(1) A person commits robbery if: 
(a) the person unlawfully and intentionally takes or attempts to take 
personal property in the possession of another from his person, or 
immediate presence, against his will, by means offeree or fear; or 
(b)The person intentionally or knowingly uses force or fear of 
immediate force against another in the course of committing a theft. 
(2) An act shall be considered "in the course of committing a theft" if it occurs 
in an attempt to commit theft, commission of theft, or in the immediate 
flight after the attempt or commission. 
(3) Robbery is a felony of the second degree. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301. This provision demonstrates that all robberies, 
regardless of whether a dangerous weapon is used, require that force or fear be used 
against the victim. 
A robbery is elevated to an aggravated robbery when the robber uses or 
threatens to use a dangerous weapon. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (2003) outlines the 
elements for aggravated robbery, stating in relevant part that "[a] person commits 
aggravated robbery if in the course of committing a robbery, he: [ ] uses or threatens 
to use a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-
302 (2003). Pursuant to this provision, a robbery is elevated to an aggravated robbery 
7 
when the robber not only uses force or fear, as required for robbery, but also uses or 
threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601 (5) 
(2003). 
Whether a robber has used or threatened to use a dangerous weapon is 
controlled by Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601 (5) which defines "dangerous weapon." 
Pursuant to this provision: 
(5) "Dangerous weapon" means: 
(a) any item capable of causing death or serious bodily injury; or 
(b) a facsimile or representation of the item; and 
(i) the actor's use or apparent intended use of the item leads the 
victim to reasonably believe the item is likely to cause death or 
serious bodily injury; or 
(ii) the actor represents to the victim verbally or in any other manner 
that he is in control of such an item. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601(5). 
Under the predecessor to these statutes, a defendant did not commit aggravated 
robbery when he held his hand in his pocket up over the counter pointing at the victim 
as if it were a gun and threatened to "blast" people if they did not cooperate. State v. 
Suniville, 741 P.2d 961, 962 (Utah 1987). This Court concluded that the defendant's 
menacing gesture with his hand in his pocket, coupled with a verbal threat to shoot 
did not elevate the crime to an aggravated robbery in Suniville because the version of 
the statute then in effect defined aggravated robbery as a robbery where the 
perpetrator used "a firearm or facsimile of a firearm." Id. at 965. Because Suniville 
did not use a weapon or a replica of a weapon and his "menacing gesture 
accompanied by verbal threats" did not establish use of a firearm, this Court held that 
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Suniville committed the crime of simple robbery when he made those gestures with 
his hand in his pocket and threatened to "blast" people. Id. 
In reaching its decision in Suniville, this Court was careful to maintain the 
distinction between robbery and aggravated robbery. Id. This Court recognized that 
all robberies involve force or fear, but that robbery is elevated to an aggravated 
robbery not because it generates fear but because, as required by the then applicable 
language, the robber used a weapon or a facsimile thereof. Id. at 964-65. This Court 
concluded that it "must observe [the] critical distinction between robbery and 
aggravated robbery where the evidence is only of verbal threats and intimidating 
gestures" in order to ensure that a distinction exists between simple and aggravated 
robbery. Id. This Court concluded that Suniville's "menacing gesture accompanied 
by verbal threats is not sufficient evidence alone to establish the use of a firearm or a 
facsimile of a firearm. To hold otherwise would pervert the language of section 76-6-
302 and erode the statutory distinction between robbery and aggravated robbery." Id. 
at 965. 
Williams v. Commonwealth, 721 S.W.2d 710 (Ky. 1986), relied upon by this 
Court in Suniville, 741 P.2d at 965, likewise recognized that because the threat of 
physical harm exists in all robberies, something more than such a threat must be used 
to elevate a crime from simple to aggravated robbery. Williams, 721 S.W.2d at 711-
13. A threat to kill someone accompanied by the defendant reaching toward his back 
pocket was not enough to elevate the crime to an aggravated robbery in Williams 
because the robber did not represent an instrument, and labeling the crime as an 
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aggravated robbery under the circumstances would blur the distinction between 
simple and aggravated robbery. Id. at 711. Although the victim in Williams believed 
that the defendant might have a weapon, the court rejected the aggravated robbery 
charge because a threat of harm also exists when a simple robbery occurs and the two 
charges must be distinguished by something other than the threat of physical harm. 
Id. 
The Commonwealth supports the conviction by asserting: "It is not fatal that 
Appellant threatened with an unseen weapon or instrument... . The 
culpability of the defendant's intent is manifested by his threat of physical 
harm and danger to the victim exists from the response to fear he perceives as 
reasonable." This, however, does not distinguish it from second degree 
robbery in which the threat of physical force is the gravamen. A response 
of perceiving danger is quite real under threat; however, such cannot serve to 
convert something merely speculated upon (a weapon or instrument) into 
established existence. 
Id. at 712. 
Additionally, the Williams court recognized that the victim's response to a 
threat cannot define the nature of the crime and a victim's speculation that there might 
be a weapon does not support an aggravated robbery charge. Id- This is so because 
the degree of the crime would be left to the subjective response of the victim rather 
than the actions of the perpetrator, and there would be no objective guidelines for an 
aggravated robbery charge. Id. Although the victim in Williams believed that the 
defendant might have had a weapon, the court rejected the aggravated robbery charge 
in part because the determination of whether a robbery is aggravated cannot be 
defined by the reaction of the victim. 
in 
To do otherwise places defendant virtually without defense at the caprice of a 
victim's subjective evaluation without regard to the actual course of events and 
could lead to convictions for crimes neither intended nor enacted. Our heritage 
of justice applies the law to the facts. Herein the fact is that although force was 
threatened, the presence of a weapon or instrument was illusory at best. 
Without an instrument's ever being seen, an intimidating threat, albeit coupled 
with a menacing gesture cannot suffice to meet the standard necessary for a 
first degree robbery conviction. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
While the statutory language changed following Suniville, the concerns 
expressed in Suniville and Williams that the statute must draw a clear distinction 
between simple and aggravated robbery remain. The actions necessary to elevate a 
robbery to an aggravated robbery cannot be left to the subjective reaction of the 
victim and instead must be guided by a statutory definition that provides a workable 
distinction between simple and aggravated robbery. Otherwise, the aggravated 
robbery statute would be applied inconsistently based on the predilections and 
emotions of victims and defendant would be left without a means for defending 
against the elevation. See Suniville, 721 P.2d at 965; Williams, 721 P.2d at 711-12; 
see also People v. Taylor, 628 N.W.2d 55 (Mich. App. 2001) (applying objective 
approach when determining whether victim reasonably believed defendant was 
armed). 
Following Suniville, the Utah legislature amended the aggravated robbery 
statutory scheme. Whereas the pre-Suniville aggravated robbery statute allowed a 
robbery to be elevated only when the robber used or threatened to use a firearm or 
knife or a facsimile thereof, the post-Suniville statute expanded the definition of 
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dangerous weapon to include circumstances where a defendant uses or threatens to 
use a facsimile or representation, coupled with a further representation or use so as to 
justify elevating the charge to an aggravated robbery. Utah Code Ann. §76-1-
601(5)(b) (1989) (compare with Utah Code Ann. § 76-l-601(5)(b) (2003). 
While use of an actual weapon qualifies as a dangerous weapon, Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-l-601(5)(b) also defines a dangerous weapon as "a facsimile or 
representation of an item; and (i) use or apparent use of that item in a manner that 
leads the victim to reasonably believe that the item is capable of causing serious 
injury or death or (ii) a representation verbally or in any other manner that the robber 
is in control of a dangerous weapon. Utah Code Ann. § 76-l-601(5)(b) (2003) 
(emphasis added). Under the plain language of this statute, in order to elevate a 
simple robbery based on use of a dangerous weapon, the robber must not only use or 
threaten to use a facsimile or representation of a weapon, but must also do something 
further to lead the victim to reasonably believe that he has a dangerous weapon or to 
represent that he has control of a dangerous weapon. The choice of the word "and" 
demonstrates that this statute requires not just a facsimile or representation but also 
something in addition which would make it reasonable to elevate the crime even 
though an actual weapon was not used. See generally Travelers/Aetna Ins. Co., 2002 
UT App 221 at ^ 12 (words should be given their commonly accepted meaning). 
The statute also outlines the "something further" that is required, supplying 
two alternatives, either of which will elevate the use or threatened use of a facsimile 
or representation to an aggravated robbery. First, if the robber uses an item that is a 
1? 
facsimile or representation of an item capable of causing death or serious bodily 
injury in a manner that leads the victim to reasonably believe that the item is likely to 
cause such injury or death, the crime is elevated to an aggravated robbery. Because of 
the concerns about defining a crime based on the subjective response of victims, the 
belief that the item is likely to cause death or serious bodily injury should be 
objectively reasonable. See e ^ Williams, 721 S.W.2d at 711; Taylor, 628 N.W.2d at 
59. Alternatively, when a robber uses or threatens use of a facsimile or representation 
of a dangerous weapon, the crime can also be elevated when the robber represents 
verbally or in some other manner that he is in control of a dangerous weapon. These 
alternative requirements added onto the use of a facsimile or representation 
demonstrate that the additional requirements must be met in order to elevate the crime 
to a first degree felony. 
The timing of the amendment and its language suggest that the legislature 
meant to encompass the circumstances of Suniville so that they would qualify as an 
aggravated robbery under the amended statute. Applying the amended statute to 
Suniville's actions, the menacing gesture would arguably fit within the first part of the 
statute as a "representation of an item," while the verbal representation by Suniville 
that he would use the item to cause death or serious bodily injury satisfied the second 
part. In other words, under the amended version of the statute, Suniville's actions 
would qualify as an aggravated robbery because he not only threatened use of a 
"representation" but, in addition, he further verbally represented that he would use a 
gun to "blast" people. See generally Suniville, 741 P.2d at 765 (outlining facts). 
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While the legislature apparently intended to incorporate the Suniville facts into 
the definition of aggravated robbery, it nevertheless took care to draw a distinction 
between simple and aggravated robbery and to require more than simply a 
"representation" of an item in order to elevate the crime. This is evident since the 
legislature did not simply amend the statute to include use or threatened use of a 
"representation" along with a "facsimile" as items that would elevate the crime. 
Instead, the legislature expanded the definition of dangerous weapon to include a 
"representation," but also required, in addition, one of the further circumstances 
outlined in section 76-l-601(5)(b)(i) and (ii). Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601(5). 
Because this Court must render all parts of the statute relevant and meaningful and 
presume that the legislature carefully chose its terms, it must presume that subsection 
(i) and (ii) play a role in this statute. Interpreting the dangerous weapon definition to 
require only a "representation" of a dangerous weapon without imposing the 
additional requirements of (i) or (ii) would render those subsections as well as the 
word "and" meaningless and superfluous. Accordingly, in interpreting the dangerous 
weapon statute, this court should require not only a representation of a dangerous 
weapon but also something further that fits within the requirements of one of these 
subsections. 
This Court's decision in State v. Hartmann, 783 P.2d 544, 546 (Utah 1989) is 
consistent with this requirement that something more than a single representation of a 
dangerous weapon is required to elevate a robbery to an aggravated robbery. In that 
case, this Court interpreted section 76-l-601(5)(b) in the context of an aggravated 
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sexual assault conviction and held that a defendant's statement "that he had a gun and 
would use it to blow [the victims'] heads off if they came down the hall during the 
attack" qualified as threatened use of a dangerous weapon. Id. This Court defined a 
threat as "the expression of an intention to inflict injury on another" and recognized 
that "[t]hreats may be communicated by action or conduct as well as by words." Id. 
(further citations omitted). While this Court rejected Hartmann's claim that verbal 
threat was not enough to find use of a dangerous weapon, the facts in Hartmann 
nevertheless show both a verbal representation by the defendant that he has a gun and, 
in addition, a verbal representation that he would use that gun. Id. at 545. This is 
consistent with the language of Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601 which requires more than 
simply a representation of a dangerous weapon. 
The court of appeals has also required both the use or threatened use of a 
facsimile or representation and either use that leads to a reasonable belief that the item 
can cause death or serious bodily injury or a representation by the robber that he is in 
control of an item that can cause death or serious bodily injury. See e ^ State v. 
Adams, 830 P.2d 310, 312 (Utah 1992) (robber who told victim he would shoot her if 
she called police and put hand on bulging pocket, led victim "to believe he had a gun 
and reasonably fear for her physical safety"); State v. Candelario, 909 P.2d 277 (Utah 
App. 1995) (claim by robber that he had a gun and threat to use it elevated crime to 
aggravated robbery). 
In Candelario, the court of appeals concluded that a representation under the 
first part of the dangerous weapon statute includes both physical and verbal 
"representations." Id. at 278. In reaching this decision, the court indicated that 
"representation" "is an expansive term, and, while it can mean 'a likeness, picture, 
model, or other reproduction/ it can also refer to 'a statement or account especially 
made to convey . . . [an] impression of something with the intention of . . . 
influencing action.5" Id. (quoting Webster's Third New Int'l. Dictionary 1926 
(1986)). Consistent with Hartmann, the court of appeals concluded in Candelario that 
a verbal representation that a robber has a gun meets the first part of the definition for 
dangerous weapon found in section 76-1-601(5). Moreover, while the robber's claim 
that he had a gun was a representation that met the first part of the statute, his 
indication that he would kill the cashier met the second requirement because the 
robber verbally represented that he was in control of and would use a dangerous 
weapon. Candelario, 909 P.2d at 278; see also Utah Code Ann. § 76-l-601(5)(b). 
Under these circumstances, the determination of whether a gun was involved was 
based on meeting the two aspects of the definition set forth in section 76-l-601(5)(b) 
and was not left to the subjective reaction of the victim. 
The court of appeals also analyzed whether a crime was elevated to an 
aggravated robbery by the use or threatened use of a dangerous weapon in State v. 
Reyos, 2004 UT App 151, 91 P.3d 861 and Adams, 830 P.2d 310. That court did not 
look to the subjective reaction of the victim in either of those cases and instead 
concluded that the defendant had used or threatened to use a dangerous weapon when 
he verbally represented that he had a gun and either put his hand on a bulging pocket 
or further represented that he would use the gun to "shoot to kill." Reyos, 2004 UT 
1 / : 
App 151 at ^ | 4; see also Adams, 830 P.2d at 313. Since the defendant in both Reyos 
and Adams did something more than simply use or threaten to use a facsimile or 
representation of an item, the court of appeals concluded that the circumstances in 
those cases met the definition of dangerous weapon. 
Requiring a representation of a dangerous weapon coupled with something 
further in order to elevate a robbery to an aggravated robbery is consistent with the 
line drawn by the Michigan courts between robbery and aggravated robbery. The 
Michigan statute, which is similar but not identical to Utah's, elevates a robbery to 
aggravated robbery when a robber is "armed with a dangerous weapon, or any article 
used or fashioned in a manner to lead the person so assaulted to reasonably believe it 
to be a dangerous weapon." Taylor, 628 N.W.2d at 57 (quoting Mich. Comp. Laws § 
750.529; Mich Stat. Ann. § 28.797). In feigned weapon cases, the Michigan courts 
have required an objectively reasonable belief that the robber is armed and have 
drawn "an absolute minimum level of evidence sufficient to support an armed robbery 
conviction . . . ." People v. Banks, 563 N.W.2d 200, 202 (Mich. 1997) (citing 
People v. Jolly, 502N.W.2d 177, 182 (Mich. 1993)). 
The "absolute minimum" necessary for a robbery to be aggravated is found in 
Jolly where there was a verbal threat that the robber would shoot if the victim did not 
comply and a bulge in the robber's vest where a gun could be concealed. Jolly, 502 
N.W.2d at 182. On the other hand, a hand in the pocket during a robbery which the 
robber moved around was not sufficient to elevate a robbery to an aggravated robbery. 
Banks, 563 N.W.2d at 202-05. The distinction made by the Michigan courts offers a 
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workable approach to preserving the distinction between robbery and aggravate 
robbery under the language of Utah's statute. 
Rather than requiring a representation of an item and a further representation 
that the item would be used to harm the victim or otherwise fit within the second 
aspect of the dangerous weapon definition, the court of appeals interpreted the 
dangerous weapon definition to require only that the defendant make a representation 
that he had an item, which according to the court of appeals, was accomplished by a 
pointed finger in a pocket. Ireland, 2005 UT App 209, ^7-13 . * Moreover, by 
allowing the subjective reaction of the victim to play a role in determining whether a 
defendant committed a simple or aggravated robbery, the court of appeals disregarded 
this Court's concerns in Suniville and opened the door for inconsistent application of 
the aggravated robbery statute based in part on a victim's predisposition for anxiety, 
fear or embellishment rather than the objective conduct of the robber. See id. 
1
 In reaching its decision that section 76-1-601 requires only a representation of an 
item, the court of appeals listed several cases that elevated a robbery to an aggravated 
robbery when a defendant represented a simulated weapon. See Ireland, 2005 UT 
App 209 at j^lO n. 1. Those cases are not persuasive since the statutes at issue in those 
cases contain different language and do not have the two part requirement set forth in 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601(5). For example, the statute at issue in State v. 
Lawrence, No. 9706017912, 2001 Del. Super. LEXIS 318, at *7 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 
28, 2001) required "that Defendant display[ ] what appear[s] to be a deadly weapon." 
Id.; see also State v. Ellison, 819 P.2d 1010 (Ariz. 1991) (to elevate to aggravated 
robbery, statute requires that defendant use a simulated dangerous weapon); DeLeon 
v. State, No. CACR 89-118, 1989 Ark. App. LEXIS 608, at *3 (Ark. Ct. App. Dec. 6, 
1989) (to elevate to aggravated robbery, statute requires that defendant be armed with 
a deadly weapon or represent by word or conduct that he is so armed). Because the 
statutes at issue in the cases listed in footnote 1 do not have the same definition and 
do not contain the two part test of section 76-1-601(5), they should not be relied upon 
in interpreting Utah's statute. 
Because the language of Utah's statute requires more than a representation of a 
weapon, the court of appeals' analysis should be rejected. Moreover, in order to 
consistently apply the aggravated robbery statute ad avoid defining aggravated 
robbery based on based on the emotions or sensitivities of the victim, this Court 
should reject the court of appeals' conclusion that the subjective response of the 
victim plays a role in defining aggravated robbery. 
A concealed gesture of a hand in a pocket fails to meet the definitional 
requirements of section 76-l-601(5)(b). Even if the gesture fits the first part of the 
definition as a representation of an item capable of causing death or serious bodily 
injury, such a gesture, without more, fails to establish facts from which it is 
reasonable to objectively believe that the item is likely to cause death or serious 
bodily injury. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-l-601(5)(b)(i); see also Taylor, 628 N.W.2d 
at 58-60 (indicating that defendant must simulate a weapon and induce an objectively 
reasonable belief that he is armed in order to elevate a robbery to an aggravated 
robbery).2 Likewise, such a gesture fails to establish that the robber is in control of an 
item likely to cause death or serious bodily injury so as to comply with section 76-1-
601(5)(b)(ii). Since the language in subsection (b)(ii) must require something more 
than a "representation of an item capable of causing death or serious bodily injury," a 
Under the weapons part of Title 76, a dangerous weapon is defined as "any item 
that in the manner of its use or intended use is capable of causing death . . . ." Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-10-50 l(5)(a) (2003). Although this is a distinct definition, it provides 
guidance in assessing whether the gesture represented a dangerous weapon and more 
importantly, whether it created an objectively reasonable belief that the item was 
likely to cause death or serious bodily injury or otherwise fit within section 76-1-6-
l(5)(b). 
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gesture in a pocket, without more, fails to establish that the robber represented that he 
was in control of an item likely to cause death. Utah Code Ann. § 76-1 -601 (5)(b)(ii). 
Accordingly, a gesture is not sufficient to elevate a robbery to aggravated robbery. 
Because a concealed gesture does not meet both requirements of section 76-1-
601(5), it does not elevate a robbery to and aggravated robbery. The court of appeals' 
determination to the contrary rendered the second part of the statute superfluous and 
improperly included a subjective aspect to the definition. Rules of statutory 
construction require that the court of appeals' definition be rejected. Accordingly, 
Ireland requests that this Court overturn the court of appeals' decision and require that 
a representation of a dangerous weapon be coupled with one of the requirements 
found in section 76-1 -601 (5)(b)(i) or (ii) in order to elevate the crime to an aggravated 
robbery. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant William Ireland, by and through counsel, respectfully requests that 
this Court reverse the decision of the court of appeals and hold that a concealed 
gesture in a pocket is not sufficient to elevate a robbery to an aggravated robbery. 
SUBMITTED this J j f day of December, 2005. 
JOAN C. WATT 
MICHAEL A. PETERSON 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
00O00 
State of Utah, 
Respondent, 
v. Case No. 
William Joseph Ireland, 
Petitioner. 
ORDER 
This matter is before the court upon a Petition for Writ of 
certiorari, filed on July 8, 2005. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to Rule 4 5 of the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure, the Petition for Writ of Certiorari is 
granted as to the following issues: 
Whether a concealed gesture of a hand in a pocket is 
sufficient to meet the criteria for aggravated robbery under Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-302. 
A briefing schedule will be established hereafter. Pursuant 
to rule 2, the court suspends the provision of rule 26(a) that 
permits the parties to stipulate to an extension of time to 
submit their briefs on the merits. The parties shall not be 
permitted to stipulate to an extension. Additionally, absent 
extraordinary circumstances, no extensions will be granted by 
motion. The parties shall comply with the briefing schedule upon 
its issuance. 
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00O00 
State of Utah, 
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v. 
William Joseph Ireland, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
OPINION 
(For Official Publication) 
Case No. 20040502-CA 
F I L E D 
(May 12, 2005) 
2005 UT App 209 
Third District, Salt Lake Department, 031908349 
The Honorable Paul G. Maughan 
Attorneys: Michael A. Peterson and Joan C. Watt, Salt Lake City, 
for Appellant 
Mark L. Shurtleff and Brett J. DelPorto, Salt Lake 
City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Billings, Davis, and Jackson, 
BILLINGS, Presiding Judge: 
%1 Defendant William Joseph Ireland (Ireland) appeals the trial 
court's judgment convicting him of aggravated robbery under Utah 
Code section 76-6-302. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (2004). We 
affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
12 On December 6, 2003, Jeffrey Reinkoester (Reinkoester) 
worked as a sales person in the Fortier jewelry store in the 
Gateway Plaza in Salt Lake City. Ireland entered the store 
wearing a thick, puffy coat and a beanie. Reinkoester greeted 
Ireland who responded, "I want you to go and get me all the money 
in the cash drawer right now. I'm not kidding. Hurry." As 
Ireland made this demand, he pointed at Reinkoester with his 
right hand, which he kept concealed in the pocket of his coat. 
Ireland's hand was held close to his right side with his elbow 
extending behind him. Reinkoester observed that Ireland gestured 
like he had a gun and described Ireland!s hand in his coat pocket 
as "pointing at [Reinkoester]." Ireland's hand was "definitely 
the conviction. The aggravated robbery statute provides that 
11
 [a] person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of 
committing a robbery, he . . . uses or threatens to use a 
dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-6-302. The dangerous weapon statute defines "[d]angerous 
weapon" as including a "facsimile or representation" of "any item 
capable of causing death or serious bodily injury." Id. § 76-1-
601(5) (a), (b) . Moreover, "the actor's use or apparent intended 
use of the item [must] lead[] the victim to reasonably believe 
the item is likely to cause death or serious bodily injury." Id, 
§ 76-1-601(5)(b)(i). 
1(8 Utah courts have upheld convictions for aggravated crimes 
when there has been some kind of verbal representation or threat 
that the defendant possessed a dangerous weapon, even where the 
defendant did not display the weapon. See State v. Hartmann, 783 
P.2d 544, 547 (Utah 1989) (upholding conviction for aggravated 
sexual assault where defendant raped a woman while telling her 
that he had a gun); State v. Reyos, 2004 UT App 151,1(3, 91 P.3d 
861 (upholding aggravated robbery conviction where defendant 
yelled, "Get the gun and shoot," and "shoot to kill" during the 
robbery but did not display a weapon); State v Candelario, 909 
P.2d 277, 277 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (upholding sentence 
enhancement for robbery where defendant claimed to have a gun and 
threatened to kill the cashier but did not display or gesture 
that he had a weapon); State v. Adams, 830 P.2d 310, 311 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1992) (upholding aggravated robbery conviction where 
defendant verbally threatened to use a gun while putting his hand 
on his bulging pocket). 
f9 Ireland argues that the pointing gesture inside his coat 
pocket does not constitute a "representation" because it was not 
verbal. We disagree and hold that the statute does not require a 
"representation" to be verbal, but rather includes nonverbal 
gestures. 
HlO In Candelario, we interpreted the term "representation" in a 
similar section of the Utah Code to include nonverbal actions. 
909 P.2d at 278. Specifically, Utah Code section 76-3-203(2) 
(the enhancement statute) provides that a sentence may be 
enhanced by one year when "fa dangerous weapon or a facsimile or 
the representation of a dangerous weapon, as provided in Section 
76-1-601!" is used while committing a second degree felony. 
Candelario, 909 P.2d at 278 (emphasis added) (quoting Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-3-203(2) (1995) (amended to what is now Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-3-203.8 (2004))). We defined "representation" as "an 
expansive term," meaning "a statement conveying an impression for 
the purpose of influencing action." Id. Moreover, we noted that 
"[s]uch a statement can be either in the form of a verbal 
assertion or nonverbal action." Id. at 278 n.2 (citing Utah R. 
Ull Turning to the facts of this case, we determine that 
Ireland's gesture of pointing his hand inside his coat pocket 
close to his right side with his elbow extended constitutes a 
representation of a dangerous weapon because such gesture was 
intended to look like a gun for the purpose of influencing 
Reinkoester to give Ireland all of the cash in the cash drawer.2 
1[12 Moreover, we determine that Reinkoester reasonably believed 
that the "item [was] intended to cause death or serious bodily 
injury." Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601(5) (b) (i) (2004) . Reinkoester 
testified that he feared that if he did not comply with Ireland1s 
request, he may be shot. Guns by their very nature are capable 
of causing death or serious bodily injury. Reinkoester's belief 
was based not only on the subjective belief that he thought 
Ireland had a gun, but also on objective evidence. Reinkoester 
saw something "pointing at [him]" inside Ireland's coat pocket. 
That something "looked like a gun." This is sufficient objective 
evidence to support a reasonable belief that one might have been 
injured if he or she did not comply. See, e.g., Parker v. State, 
607 S.W.2d 378, 379 (Ark. 1980) (holding that victim's subjective 
apprehension coupled with defendant's objective conduct was 
sufficient to sustain a conviction of aggravated robbery); 
Faulkner v. State, 581 S.E.2d 365, 367 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003) 
(determining that victim had "reasonable apprehension" where 
defendant used his hand covered with a sock to look like a gun 
and pressed it against victim's back); People v. Taylor, 628 
N.W.2d 55, 61 (Mich. Ct. App. 2001) (holding there was ample 
objective evidence that defendant either had a gun or simulated 
2. Ireland relies heavily upon State v. Suniville, 741 P.2d 961 
(Utah 1987), where the Utah Supreme Court held, under a previous 
version of the aggravated robbery statute, that the defendant did 
not commit aggravated robbery where he had his hand in his pocket 
held up over the counter as if he had a gun, and made threats 
that he would "blast" people if they did not cooperate. Id. at 
962. The prior version of the aggravated robbery statute 
narrowly defined aggravated robbery as where the perpetrator used 
"a firearm or a facsimile of a firearm, knife or a facsimile of a 
knife or a deadly weapon." Id.; Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 
(1978). The court held that the "[d]efendant's menacing gesture 
accompanied by verbal threats is not sufficient evidence alone to 
establish the use of a firearm or a facsimile of a firearm. To 
hold otherwise would pervert the language of section 76-6-302 and 
erode the statutory distinction between robbery and aggravated 
robbery." Id. at 965. However, since the Suniville decision, 
the Utah Legislature amended the aggravated robbery statute to 
include not only a "facsimile" but also a "representation" of 
"any item capable of causing death or serious bodily injury." 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601(5)(a),(b) (2004). 
ADDENDUM C 
65 of 78 DOCUMENTS 
State of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Ryan Wayne Johnson, 
Defendant and Appellee. 
Case No. 20040522-CA 
COURT OF APPEALS OF UTAH 
2005 UTApp 210; 2005 Utah App. LEXIS 215 
May 12, 2005, Filed 
NOTICE: [*1] NOT FOR OFFICIAL 
PUBLICATION 
PRIOR HISTORY: Third District, Salt 
Lake Department, 041900176. The Honor-
able Leslie A. Lewis. 
LexisNexis(R) Headnotes 
COUNSEL: Mark L. Shurtleff and Brett J. 
DelPorto, Salt Lake City, for Appellant. 
Patrick L. Anderson and Debra Meek Nel-
son, Salt Lake City, for Appellee. 
JUDGES: Judith M. Billings, Presiding 
Judge. WE CONCUR: James Z. Davis, 
Judge, Norman H. Jackson, Judge. 
OPINIONBY: Judith M. Billings 
OPINION: 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
BILLINGS, Presiding Judge: 
The State appeals an interlocutory order 
granting Defendant Ryan Wayne Johnson's 
motion to reduce the charges from aggra-
vated robbery to robbery on six counts. The 
State argues that the trial court erred in in-
terpreting the term "representation" of a 
dangerous weapon in Utah Code sections 
76-6-302 and 76-1-601 to include only ver-
bal statements. Utah Code Ann. § § 76-6-
302, 76-1-601 (2004). The State avers that 
Johnson's use of his hand in his pocket to 
simulate a gun constitutes a nonverbal "rep-
resentation" within the meaning of the Utah 
Code. Johnson argues that even if we de-
termine nonverbal statements or gestures 
constitute a "representation" under the stat-
ute, the [*2] victims did not have a reason-
able belief that "the item [was] likely to 
cause death or serious bodily injury" as re-
quired by Utah Code section 76-1-601. nl 
Id. § 76-1-601(5)(b)(i). We reverse on five 
counts and affirm on one count of the rob-
bery charges. 
Before Judges Billings, Davis, and Jackson. 
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2005 UT App 210; 2005 Utah App. LEXIS 215, * 
nl We review the trial court's inter-
pretation of statutes for correctness. 
See State v. Pixton, 2004 UT App 275, 
P 4, 98 P. 3d 433. 
Johnson was charged with a total of six 
counts of aggravated robbery in two sepa-
rate criminal informations. Four counts al-
legedly occurred in December 2003 and 
two counts in January 2004. Victims testi-
fied that on each occasion Johnson ap-
proached the victim and asked for money, 
that Johnson had a bulge in his right pocket, 
that he had his hand in his pocket, and that 
something was protruding which looked 
like a gun. The testimony was that Johnson 
made no verbal threats nor did he tell any of 
the victims that he had a gun in his posses-
sion. In addition, some of the victims testi-
fied that they complied [*3] with Johnson's 
requests because they feared for their lives. 
In State v. Ireland, No. 20040502-CA, 
113 P.3d 1028, 2005 UT App 209 also is-
sued today, we held that a "representation" 
constitutes both verbal and nonverbal 
statements or gestures. See id. at P10. Be-
cause the facts of this case are nearly iden-
tical to those of Ireland, the same reasoning 
applies. Consequently, we hold that the trial 
court erred in interpreting Utah Code sec-
tions 76-6-302 and 76-1-601 and that a 
"representation" may be made by both ver-
bal and nonverbal statements or gestures. 
For each of the six counts of robbery, John-
son's action of holding his hand in his 
pocket simulating a gun constitutes a "rep-
resentation" within the meaning of Utah 
Code section 76-1-60L Johnson's conduct 
is sufficient to sustain aggravated robbery 
charges so long as the victims "reasonably 
belie[ved] the item [was] likely to cause 
death or serious bodily injury." Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-1-601 (5)(b)(i). 
After reviewing the record on each of 
the six counts, we determine that the vic-
tims had the requisite "reasonable belief to 
sustain an aggravated robbery charge in all 
but one of the six counts. In Ireland [*4] , 
we determined that there must be objective 
conduct by the defendant coupled with the 
victim's subjective apprehension to consti-
tute a reasonable belief. See 2005 UT App 
22 at PI2. In five of the counts, victims tes-
tified that they saw or assumed that Johnson 
had a gun, and for that reason they com-
plied with Johnson's request to give him 
money. However, the victim in Count I, oc-
curring in January 2004, "didn't think [that 
Johnson had a gun] because the bulge was-
n't big enough." Moreover, the victim stated 
she thought that Johnson "was very nice-
spoken [ , ] . . . not aggressive, not anything 
that would make you think that he was go-
ing to cause you harm." Clearly, this victim 
did not have the requisite reasonable belief 
that Johnson would cause "death or serious 
bodily injury," and the objective facts of the 
encounter reinforce this reasonable belief. 
Thus, there cannot be an aggravated rob-
bery charge for this count. 
Accordingly, we reverse on the four 
counts occurring in December 2003 and 
Count II in January 2004 and hold that 
those counts sustain an aggravated robbery 
charge under Utah Code sections 76-6-302 
and 76-1-601. See Utah Code Ann. § § 76-
6-302 [*5] , 76-1-60L We affirm Count I 
in January 2004 as a robbery charge be-
cause the victim did not have the requisite 
reasonable objective belief to sustain an ag-
gravated robbery charge. 
Judith M. Billings, 
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Presiding Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
James Z. Davis, Judge 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
ADDENDUM D 
76-6-302. Aggravated robbery, 
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of committing 
robbery, he: 
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 
76-1-601; 
(b) causes serious bodily injury upon another; or 
(c) takes or attempts to take an operable motor vehicle. 
(2) Aggravated robbery is a first degree felony. 
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act shall be considered to be "in the 
course of committing a robbery" if it occurs in an attempt to commit, during the 
commission of, or in the immediate flight after the attempt or commission of a 
robbery. 
76-1-601- Definitions. 
Unless otherwise provided, the following terms apply to this title: 
(5) "Dangerous weapon" means: 
(a) any item capable of causing death or serious bodily injury; or 
(b) a facsimile or representation of the item; and: 
(i) the actor's use or apparent intended use of the item leads 
the victim to reasonably believe the item is likely to cause death 
or serious bodily injury; or 
(ii) the actor represents to the victim verbally or in any other 
manner that he is in control of such an item. 
ADDENDUM E 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WILLIAM JOSEPH IRELAND, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CASE NO. 031908349 
This matter was brought before the Court by Motion on March 
17, 2004. The State has brought aggravated robbery charges against 
defendant William Joseph Ireland, pursuant to Section 76-6-302, 
Utah Code Ann. Mr. Ireland has waived his right to a jury trial, 
and intends to enter a guilty plea. The sole issue before the 
Court is whether Mr. Ireland is guilty of a first or second degree 
felony. Mr. Ireland is prepared to admit that on December 6, 2003, 
he entered Fortier Jewelers located in the Gateway Mall at 11 S. 
Rio Grande Street, and demanded jewelry and money from a store 
employee. 
The testimony of the employee/witness established that the 
defendant entered the store with his right hand in his coat pocket. 
The coat was described as large and puffy, perhaps a parka. The 
defendant's hand was held close to his right side, with the elbow 
extending toward the back or behind the defendant. While the 
CT/I 
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defendant's hand was in this position, he told the witness, "I want 
you to go and get me all the money in the cash drawer right now." 
The witness described the defendant's action as: "There was one 
hand in a pocket, gesturing like there was a gun," (Hearing Tr. p. 
11.) The witness also described the defendant's hand in the 
defendant's coat pocket as "pointing at me." (Hearing Tr. p. 11.) 
He further described the defendant's hand as "it was definitely 
gesturing like there was a weapon, but it was more subtle." 
(Hearing Tr. p. 12.) The witness then testified that he thought 
the defendant had a weapon based on the motioning of the 
defendant's hand in the defendant's coat pocket. (Hearing Tr. p. 
13.) 
The witness admitted he did not know whether the defendant had 
a gun and that he never saw a gun, but assumed the defendant had a 
gun because of the gesturing of the defendant' s hand in the 
defendant's coat pocket. (Hearing Tr. at p. 16.) Additionally, 
the bulge in the defendant's pocket, and the way it looked, pointed 
at the witness led the witness to believe the defendant had a 
weapon. (Hearing Tr. at p. 27.) At the time of the robbery, the 
witness felt that the defendant may have had a weapon in his hand, 
and the witness testified that he was afraid that he might be shot 
if he did not comply with the defendant's request. (Hearing Tr. at 
p. 27.) It was the witness's further impression that the defendant 
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intended to make the witness believe that the defendant had a gun 
in his pocket; and he did so believe. (Hearing Tr. at p.28.) 
The issue before the Court is whether a nonverbal gesture 
constitutes a "representation" of a dangerous weapon pursuant to 
Section 76-1-601, Utah Code Ann, This issue appears to be one of 
first impression in the state of Utah. 
In State v. Suniville, 741 P.2d 961 (Utah 1987), the Utah 
Supreme Court overturned an aggravated robbery conviction based on 
a prior statute where the defendant had stated, "This is a robbery, 
don!t turn it into a homicide. Give me all of your money." Ld. at 
962. The defendant approached the teller with his right hand 
inside of his coat pocket, which he lifted over the counter. The 
witness testified that, "something was pointing at me in his 
pocket." Id. at 962. Based upon those facts and the statute in 
effect at the time, the Supreme Court stated that the defendant had 
not used a firearm, or a facsimile of a firearm, or a deadly 
weapon. Id. at 965 (relying on Utah Code Ann., Section 76-6-302 
(1975), which stated that " [a] person commits aggravated robbery if 
in the course of committing robbery, he: (a) uses a firearm or a 
facsimile of a firearm...or a deadly weapon...."). 
In apparent response to the Suniville decision, the 
legislature amended Section 76-6-302, Utah Code Ann., which reads 
in pertinent part: 
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(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in 
the course of committing robbery, he: 
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous 
weapon.... 
Section 76-1-601, defines "dangerous weapon" as: 
(a) any item capable of causing death or 
serious bodily injury; or 
(b) a facsimile or representation of the 
item; and: 
(i) the actor's use or apparent 
intended use of the item leads the victim to 
reasonably believe the item is likely to cause 
death or serious bodily injury; or 
(ii) The actor represents to the 
victim verbally or in any other manner that he 
is in control of such an item. 
A review of the case law in this state since Suniville 
indicates that convictions of defendants have been upheld where a 
defendant made a verbal representation that he or she has a gun or 
will use a gun or a weapon and the statement is accompanied with a 
show of an apparent weapon, that is, a hand in a pocket. See, 
e.g., State v. Adams, 830 P.2d 310 (Utah App. 1992). This Court 
must decide whether a representation may be made by a hand and 
gestures of the hand absent a verbal representation. This Court 
concludes that the elements of the crime alleged in this case have 
been met by the defendant' s gestures as set forth above. 
In the case before the Court, the witness clearly indicated he 
felt the defendant had a weapon. As the Court indicated during the 
course of the hearing, it is not fair, reasonable or wise to place 
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the burden upon a witness to inquire whether or not a bulge in the 
defendants pocket is or is not a weapon. 
It defies logic to allow a defendant to induce a victim to 
believe the defendant has a weapon and thereby coerce a victim to 
perform some act based on the defendant's representations and then 
allow the defendant to benefit when it is later shown the defendant 
in fact had no such weapon. The Court finds in this case that the 
defendant's placement of his hand in his pocket and the gesturing 
accompanying it, as testified to by the witness, constituted a 
representation. Therefore, the State is within its discretion in 
charging this matter as a first degree felony. 
Although the statutory language governing aggravated robbery 
seems to clearly encompass the defendant's actions, this Court is 
further persuaded that the defendant can be charged with aggravated 
robbery by the case law of other states interpreting statutes 
similar to ours. Whether a weapon or a facsimile is actually 
displayed in the commission of a crime, or a verbal representation 
that such a weapon is in the possession of the perpetrator, or 
whether the representation is made by menacing gestures, the effect 
is the same on the victim. A facsimile of a gun can cause no more 
harm than leading one to believe the perpetrator actually has a 
gun, whether by word or action. The Utah statute is similar to 
that found in New York. New York's law reads: 
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A person is guilty of robbery in the second 
degree if he forcibly steals property and if, 
in the course of the commission of the crime 
he " [displays] what appears to be a pistol, 
revolver, rifle, shotgun, machine gun, or 
other firearm." 
N.Y. Penal Law § 160.10(2) (b) , as quoted in People v. Knowles, 436 
N.Y.S.2d 25 (Sup. Ct. 1981) . The Supreme Court appellate division 
of New York held in Knowles: 
We hold today that if a person who is in fact 
unarmed commits a robbery and, in the course 
thereof, positions his hand in his pocket in a 
manner that is intended to convey to his 
victim the impression that he is holding a 
firearm, that said person has committed 
robbery in the second degree within the 
meaning of the statute quoted above. 
436 N.Y.2d at 25. 
Delaware!s statute is also similar to Utah's, and in State v. 
Lawrence, 2001 Del. Super. Lexis 318 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 28, 
2001), aff 'd, 790 A.2d 476 (Del. 2002), held that the term 
"displays" included a defendant's act of wrapping a cloth around 
his hand so that it appeared to hide a gun, and where the victim 
reasonably felt that the defendant was armed. 
The facts of this case are very similar to Deleon v. Arkansas, 
1989 Ark. App., Lexis 608 (1999), which interpreted another statute 
much like Utah's. In Deleon, the defendant entered a convenience 
store to purchase a pack of cigarettes, and stated to the clerk, 
"Would you mind filling me up a sack?" Ld. at *2. As the clerk 
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reached for a bag, he noticed that the man had his hand in his 
pocket. Id. The clerk testified, "I figured he had a weapon in his 
pocket or a gun." id. The Court of Appeals of Arkansas stated 
that when the defendant put his hand in his pocket, he did so "for 
the purpose of inducing the belief that he was armed with a deadly 
weapon and that although he used no threatening words [as to the 
use of a weapon] , his conduct had the desired effect upon the 
victim," who perceived the defendant's actions to be menacing or 
threatening. Id. at *4. 
This Court believes that the reasoning of these cases is sound 
and consistent with the terms of Utah's revised statute, and 
concludes that "representation" includes not only words, but 
threatening gestures and movements which would indicate the 
defendant is in possession of a dangerous weapon. 
The State's filing of this action as a first degree felony is 
upheld. 
The State is to prepare the appropriate JElindings / Conclusions 
and an Order. 
Dated this ^ — day of April, 
PAUL G.-MAUGHAN 
DISTRICT COURT MjDGg 
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